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CASE COMMENTS

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BONDS: THE DEMISE
OF THE PUBLIC PURPOSE DOCTRINE
State v. Osceola County IndustrialDevelopment Authority,
424 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1982)
Appellant challenged validation, of industrial development bonds proposed
to finance a motel near a tourist attraction.2 Appellant argued validation was
an unconstitutional extension of public credit to private enterprise.3 Affirming
validation, the trial court ruled the motel served a constitutional public purpose.4 The Florida Supreme Court reversed on direct appeal, 5 finding the
motel project not statutorily authorized. 6 On rehearing, the supreme court
affirmed the trial court validation and HELD, a motel serving a tourism facility
is a constitutionally recognized public project because it promotes tourism and
economic development.
Historically, the Florida Constitution expressly prohibited lending public
credit to any private enterprise.8 The Florida Supreme Court extended this
prohibition to private economic development projects which could benefit the
community.9 The court believed that authorizing such projects could render
the prohibition against lending public credit meaningless, because any new
business benefits the community in some way. 10 An additional concern was that
allowing public financing of private projects would ultimately destroy the free
enterprise system."L
1. FL. STAT. §§ 75.01-.09 (1981). These sections grant circuit courts jurisdiction to
validate public bonds upon petition by any governmental unit with proper authority to issue
bonds. The state is made a party to all such actions. Appeals by any party are made directly
to the Florida Supreme Court. See also FLA. CONsr. art. V, § 3(b)(2).
2. State v. Osceola County Indus. Dev. Auth., 424 So. 2d 789, 739 (Fla. 1982). The motel
was located near Disney World. Id.
3. Id. The Florida Constitution provides in part: "Neither the state nor any county,
school district, municipality, special district, or agency of any of them, shall . . .lend or use
its taxing power or credit to aid any corporation, association, partnership or person; .
FLA. CONsr. art. VII, § 10.
4. 424 So. 2d at 739.
5. FLA. CONSr. art. V, § 3(b)(2) grants the Florida Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear
appeals from final judgments in proceedings for bond validations. Specific jurisdiction is also
authorized by statute. FLA. STAT. §§ 159.25-.A31 (1981).
6. State v. Osceola County Indus. Dev. Auth., 1982 Fla. L.W. 261, 261 (Fla. June 4, 1982),
rev'd, 424 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1982).
7. 424 So. 2d at 789.
8. FLA. CONsr. art. IX, § 10 (1885) was originally adopted in 1875 as an amendment to
id. art. XIII, § 7 (1868). This section provided in part: "The credit of the state shall not be
pledged or loaned to any individual company, corporation or association; .... The legislature shall not authorize any county . . .to loan its credit to, any corporation, association,
institution or individual."
9. See, e.g., State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952) (government securities to finance aluminum plant for economic development held violation of prohibition
against lending public credit).
10. Id. at 784-85.
11. Id. at 785. "The financing of private enterprises by means of public funds is entirely
foreign to a proper concept of our constitutional system. Experience has shown that such encroachments will lead inevitably to the ultimate destruction of the free. enterprise system."
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Recognizing that most public improvement projects also benefit private
business, the Florida Supreme Court developed the public purpose doctrine to
12
validate bonds for projects which only incidentally benefited private business.
If the project's paramount purpose was public, incidental private benefits
were not unconstitutional; therefore, the project could receive public credit in
the form of industrial development bonds.' The distinction between public
and private purposes, however, was not always clear. The court found that
racetracks14 and trade centers 5 promoting tourism and economic development
7
6
served paramount public purposes. But industrial and commercial projects'
generally stimulating the economy served primarily private purposes. Whereas

Id. See also City of Clearwater v. Caldwell, 75 So. 2d 765, 766 (Fla. 1954) (lease of city land
for hotel construction held threatening to free enterprise system, and was, therefore, unacceptable since it would ultimately justify lending public credit to all private business).
12. See State v. Board of Control, 66 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 1953) (bond validation upheld
for dormitory construction at University of Florida despite private benefit to student fraternities).
13. Id. at 212. Industrial revenue bonds are government issued bonds for capital projects
which are repaid from project revenues. FLA. STAT. § 159.27(1) (1981). The bonds are attractive
investments for bond purchasers because interest earned on them is exempt from federal
income tax. I.R.C. § 103(b)(2) (West Supp. 1982). See generally Pitcher, Use of Tax-Exempt
Municipal Bonds to Finance Private Projects in Florida, 56 FLA. B.J. 253 (1982). Several
Florida statutes authorize counties, cities, and local governmental authorities to issue industrial development bonds to finance projects serving the public interest. E.g., FLA. STAT.
§§ 159.44-.53 (1981) (authorizing counties to create industrial development authorities for
financing projects described in the Florida Industrial Development Financing Act. FLA. STAT.
§§ 159.25-.431 (1981)).
A private developer must submit financial details of the proposed project to the local
industrial development authority. After a determination of the project's merit, the local
authority may adopt an inducement resolution authorizing issuance of industrial development
bonds to finance the project. The developer takes possession of the project under a loan, lease,
or installment sales agreement with the development authority. Payments pursuant to the
agreement are used to retire the bonds. See generally Citrin & Schwartz, Industrial Revenue
Bond Financing in Florida,55 FLA. B.J. 779 (1981); Pitcher, supra, at 253.
14. State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 89 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1956)
(motor speedway served paramount public purpose by promoting tourism and providing
recreation for local citizens; six-month lease to private racing organization was of only
incidental private benefit).
15. State v. Inter-American Center Auth., 84 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1955) (trade center to
promote economic development and strengthen cultural relations with other countries served
paramount public purpose and provided only indirect benefits to private enterprise).
16. E.g., State v. Clay County Dev. Auth., 140 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1962) (industrial development bond financing of plastics plant for lease to private industry held unconstitutional
lending of public credit, despite increased employment opportunities); State v. Town of
North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952) (public bond financing of aluminum plant involved
direct economic support of private enterprise and provided no more public benefit than any
new business stimulating the economy).
17. E.g., State v. Manatee County Port Auth., 193 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 1966) (industrial development bonds for construction of phosphate loading docks leased to private railroad
companies held unconstitutional use of public credit, notwithstanding economic benefit to
community); State v. Suwanee County Dev. Auth., 122 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1960) (bonds for
construction of buildings to lease to business for purpose of economic development did not

come within the public purpose doctrine).
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a civic center was found to serve a paramount public purpose in one city',1 a
similar project in another city was deemed to serve mostly private interests. 19
Concern for the integrity of free enterprise, however, was the consistent theme
underlying the supreme court's decisions.20 Thus, projects granting exclusive
control or substantial benefits to private interests could not serve paramount
21
public purposes.
State v. Jacksonville Port Authority22 reaffirmed earlier holdings that the
public purpose doctrine did not include projects undertaken exclusively by and
for private interests. Appellees sought bond validation for financing shipyard
construction, arguing that promotion of the port and economic development
were paramount public purposes.2 3 The Florida Supreme Court focused on the
private control of the shipyard 24 and the fact that all profits would benefit only
the corporate lessee.2 5 Denying validation, the court stated that generally
economic development alone, however great, did not serve a paramount public
purpose.2 The bonds were, therefore, an unconstitutional extension of public
credit to private enterprise.2 7 Noting that many businesses move to Florida
without the aid of public financing,28 the majority expressed concern over un29
necessary state encroachment on free enterprise.
18. Panama City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1957) (civic center, city hall, and boat
marinas operated by city served paramount public purpose, while civic center concessions
leased to private business involved only incidental benefits to private enterprise).
19. City of West Palm Beach v. State, 113 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1959) (civic center, marina,
restaurant, and stores were controlled almost exclusively by private enterprise under lease
agreement with city and therefore served predominantly private purposes).
20. See, e.g., State v. Clay County Dev. Auth., 140 So. 2d 576, 581 (1962); City of West
Palm Beach v. State, 113 So. 2d 374, 378 (Fla. 1959); State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d
779, 785 (Fla. 1952). According to an early decision, the purpose of the constitutional provision was "to restrict the activities and functions of the state, county and municipality to
that of government and forbid their engaging directly or indirectly in commercial enterprises
for profit." Bailey v. City of Tampa, 92 Fla. 1030, 111 So. 119 (1926).
21. 113 So. 2d at 378. See also State v. Manatee County Port Auth., 193 So. 2d 162, 164
(Fla. 1966) (exclusive use of facilities by private interests is not purely incidental to main
project and therefore does not serve public purpose); State v. Clay County Dev. Auth., 140
So. 2d 576, 580 (Fla. 1962) (enterprise of private profit under exclusive control of private
corporation held not a paramount public purpose).
22. 204 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1967).
23. Id. at 882. Appeilees also argued that the shipyard would contribute to the national
defense, since the corporate tenant anticipated contracts with the United States Navy. Id.
24. Id. at 884.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 885. The court also noted earlier cases which held public financing of private
enterprise to alleviate unemployment and promote economic development would render the
prohibition against lending public credit meaningless. Id. at 885-86 n.9. But cf. State v. Ocean
Highway & Port Auth., 217 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1968) (court upheld industrial development
bonds for a pulp and paper plant where the legislature had statutorily determined promotion
of economy was necessary for the county's welfare, and voters had approved financing in
special election).
27. 204 So. 2d at 885.
28. "Id.at 886. The court cited Disney Enterprises, Westinghouse, Anheuser Busch and
others as new businesses evidencing the success of free enterprise without public financing.
Id.
29. Id.
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While retaining the general prohibition against lending public funds to
private interests, the 1968 Florida constitutional revision provided exceptions
for certain enterprises 0 The new constitution allowed industrial development
bond financing for public projects such as airports and port facilities.31 In
addition, bonds for private industrial and manufacturing plants could be approved within prescribed limits.3 2 These exceptions were intended to improve

Florida's competitive position in attracting new industry.33 Despite the revisions, conflicts remained between the policies of promoting economic de34
velopment and preventing government interference with the free market.
The boundaries of the constitutional exceptions permitting industrial
development bond financing were initially defined in Nohrr v. Brevard County
Educational Facilities Authority.- The appellant in Nohrr challenged validation of industrial development bonds for dormitories at a private, nonprofit
7
university.38 Ruling the list of constitutional exceptions not exclusive,
the Florida Supreme Court deferred to a legislative finding that all higher educational facilities serve a paramount public purpose.38 The court upheld the
bond validation, thus extending the public purpose doctrine to projects
controlled exclusively by private, albeit nonprofit, institutions. 39
Under Nohrr, explicit legislative findings of public purposes are determinative unless clearly erroneous. 40 Responding to this judicial presumption of
FLA. CONsT. art. VII, § 10(c) (1968).
31. Id. § 10(c)(1).
32. Id. § 10(c)(2). This section imposes two requirements for industrial development
bond financing of industrial or manufacturing plants: (1) the interest on the bonds must
be exempt from federal income taxation, and (2) the revenue bonds must be payable solely
from project revenues. The first requirement allows for changes in federal tax policy to
expand or limit the types of industrial projects which can be financed through industrial
revenue bonds. Id.
33. See Florida Constitutional Revision Comm. Hearings, No. 60, 359-70 (1966). See also
Florida Industrial Development Financing Act (FIDFA), 1969 Fla. Laws ch. 104, §§ 1-19 (the
original act was intended to effectuate the purposes of § 10(c) by promoting the state's industrial economy through industrial bond financing) (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 159.25A1 (Supp. 1982)).
34. See Hearings Before the Fla. Senate Comm. on Reorganization 56 (Mar. 19, 1969)
(industrial development bonds considered alien to capitalism and a governmental intrusion
into free enterprise), cited in Storace & Gong, The Florida Industrial Development Financing
Act: Public-PrivateInvestment in Social Engineering,24 U. FLA. L. REv. 433, 437 (1972).
35. 247 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1971).
36. Id. at 306.
37. Id. at 308-09. The court indicated that proposed revenue bond projects not in the
exempted class in FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10(c) must meet the requirements set forth in
earlier cases (citing State v. Jacksonville Port Auth., 204 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1967)). The two
essential requirements are that proposed industrial development bonds must have a paramount public purpose, and be repaid from project revenues only. 247 So. 2d at 308-09.
38. 247 So. 2d at 309. The particular statute involved was the Counties Higher Educational Facilities Authorities Law, 1969 Fla. Laws ch. 345, §§ 1-23 (current version at FLA.

30.

STAT.

§ 243.18-.40 (1981)).

39. The supreme court later reaffirmed Nohrr and upheld validation of industrial development bonds for a private nonprofit hospital. Wald v. Sarasota County Health Facilities
Auth., 360 So. 2d 763, 769 (Fla. 1978). The public purpose doctrine still applied to nonexempted projects, as it did in cases prior to the constitutional revision. 247 So. 2d at 308-09.
40. 247 So. 2d at 309. Accord State v. Housing Fin. Auth., 376 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (Fla.
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constitutionality, the Florida Legislature amended the statutes 1 to declare
projects in "agriculture, tourism, urban development, and health care industries, among others," serve predominantly public purposes. 42 The legislature concluded that industrial bond financing of such projects would better
fulfill government's responsibility to provide for the public's health, safety, and
welfare.4 3 Following the statutory revisions, the Supreme Court of Florida
upheld bond validations of for-profit nursing homes- and urban development
projects. 45 Thus, the public purpose doctrine now encompasses economic development projects which provide public services or meet specific public needs.
State v. Orange County Industrial Development Authority46 continued the
trend of judicial deference to legislative findings and the resulting expansion
of the public purpose doctrine. The state challenged the constitutionality of a
statute authorizing industrial development bonds for constructing a convention center hotel.4 7 The challenged statute listed convention centers and
"all appurtenances and facilities incidental thereto, such as . .. public lodg.," as projects serving predominantly public purposes. 4 8 The Florida
ing..
Supreme Court found the hotel was part of the convention center plan and
necessary to the center's success. 40 Relying on Nohrr, the court upheld the
statute's constitutionality by deferring to the legislative finding. 0 Citing
evidence of tourism's substantial impact in central Florida 5 the supreme court
indicated greater willingness to recognize economic development alone as a
paramount public purpose.
The instant case provided the Florida Supreme Court an opportunity to
clarify whether economic development alone constitutes a paramount public
1979) (legislative declaration of public purpose is presumed valid unless clearly erroneous);
Wald v. Sarasota County Health Facilities Auth., 360 So. 2d 763, 770 (Fla. 1978) (legislative
finding that nonprofit health facilities serve a public purpose is determinative).
41. FIDFA, FLA. STAT. §§ 159.26-A31 (1980). The projects for which the legislature
authorized industrial development bond financing include: agriculture processing or storage
facilities; warehousing or distribution facilities; headquarters facilities; tourism facilities;
convention or trade show facilities; urban parkng facilities; health care facilities; commercial
projects in designated slum area or blighted area; hazardous or solid waste facilities; and
public lodging or restaurant facilities appurtenant to projects qualifying for industrial development bond financing. Id. § 159.27(5).
42. Id. § 159.26.
43. Id.
44. State v. Volusia County Indus. Dev. Auth., 400 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 1981) (bond
financing of for-profit nursing home serves paramount public purpose and provides only
incidental benefits to a private corporation); State v. Leon County, 400 So. 2d 949, 951 (Fla.
1981) (legislative declaration that for-profit health facilities serve public purpose is sufficient
to satisfy paramount public purpose test).
45. State v. Leon County, 410 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. 1982) (convention center hotel across
from new convention center would serve a paramount public purpose by eliminating urban
blight).
46. 417 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1982).
47. Id. at 961. See supra note 41.
48. FIDFA, FLA. STAT. § 159.27(5) (1981). See supra note 41.
49. 417 So. 2d at 961-62.
50. Id. at 962. The court also cited State v. City of Miami, 379 So. 2d 651, 653 (Fla. 1980)
where it upheld bond validation for a convention center garage. 417 So. 2d at 962.
51. 417 So. 2d at 960.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 9
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. xxxv

purpose. The state argued that bond validation for financing motel construction was an unconstitutional lending of public credit to private enterprise.52 Proponents of validation argued the motel was needed to meet increased
53
demand for lodging created by recent expansion at nearby Disney World.
On first hearing,5 the supreme court reversed validation, holding the motel
was not actually part of the theme park development as statutorily required. s
The court, narrowly construing the statute, found that a motel alone is not a
constitutionally cognizable public project merely because it facilitates economic
development.56
On rehearing, however, the supreme court broadly interpreted the statute
and declared a motel is a public project if its primary purpose is to serve any
tourism facility.57 Upholding validation, the instant court recited evidence of
tourism's economic importance for Florida, 58 and noted the anticipated demand for motel rooms due to Disney World's expansion.59 Because the motel
provides employment, it serves a paramount public purpose by advancing the
economic prosperity of the people.60 Analogizing the instant motel to the convention center hotel in Orange County, the court concluded that benefits to a
private corporation do not prevent the motel from serving a public purpose.61
To the dissent, 62 the statutory requirement that lodging be appurtenant to
a tourism facility meant the instant motel must be part of the theme park development.6 3 Whereas the hotel in Orange County was part of a convention
center plan, the instant motel was an independent business which located near
a tourist attraction to capitalize on the demand for lodging. 64 Citing Jackson52. State v. Osceola County Indus. Dev. Auth., 424 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1982).
53. Id.
54. State v. Osceola County Indus. Dev. Auth., 1982 Fla. L.W. 261, 261 (Fla. June 4,
1982), rev'd, 424 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1982). The instant case was originally decided the same day
as State v. Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth., 417 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1982). See supra notes 46-51
and accompanying text.
55. 1982 Fla. L.W. at 262-63.
56. Id. The court stated it must presume the legislature intended a constitutional
statute. Industrial development bond financing of a motel not part of a tourist development
would be unconstitutional, because a motel alone is purely a business facility serving no
paramount public purpose. Id.
57. 424 So. 2d at 742.
58. Id. at 740.
59. Id. The court indicated 20,000 additional motel rooms would be needed to accommodate the increase in tourists due to Disney World's expansion. Id. at 741. Note, however,
that one of the attractions which the motel was to serve, Reedy Creek Resort Area, would
have its own lodging facilities and another, Little England, was bankrupt at the time of the
court's decision. Orlando Sentinel. Jan. 24, 1982, § "Class of 83", at 27.
60. 424 So. 2d at 740. The court upheld the trial court's finding that the motel served
a paramount public purpose. Id. at 739. Additionally, the court cited Nohrr for the proposition that legislative findings of public purpose are determinative. Id. at 742.
61. Id. at 742. The court found the primary purpose of the instant motel was to provide service in connection with a tourist facility, similar to the convention center hotel in
Orange County, 417 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1982).
62. Justices Boyd and Overton filed separate dissenting opinions in which they concurred with one another. 424 So. 2d at 743-45.
63. Id. at 743 (Boyd, J., dissenting). See supra notes 41 & 48 and accompanying text.
64. 424 So. 2d at 745 (Overton, J., dissenting).
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,

vile Port Authority, the dissent considered the proposed bonds unconstitutional because general economic development alone is not a paramount public
purpose. 65 Moreover, such low cost, publicly assisted financing would interfere
with private capital investments. 66 In effect, competitive advantages would
be provided to those corporations that could muster the most political influence
67
over local industrial development bond authorities.
The instant decision significantly expands the public purpose doctrine by
holding that general economic development serves a paramount public purpose.
Before the 1968 constitutional revision, projects granting exclusive control or
substantial benefits to private interests could not serve paramount public purposes. 68 Judicial deference to legislative findings subsequently expanded the
public purpose doctrine to encompass certain private projects. These private
projects, however, offered public services through medical or educational facilities.69 While public benefits from some private projects, such as housing and
urban development, were more remote, they nevertheless fulfilled a public
needy0 The instant case extends the public purpose doctrine to private, forprofit projects which provide only incidental public benefits. 71 The public
purpose doctrine has become, in effect, more rhetoric than reality.
Practically, the instant decision is a logical extension of Orange County.
There is little difference between financing a hotel serving a convention center
and one serving a tourist attraction. Both are operated solely for private profit
and are located near facilities statutorily defined as projects achieving public
purposes. Unlike Orange County, however, there was no finding by the instant
court that the motel was necessary to the tourist attraction's success. Further,
the instant motel was not part of Disney World's planned expansion, while the
Orange County hotel was planned in the convention center's development.
While a logical extension of Orange County, the instant decision is inconsistent with earlier case law.72 The instant majority ignored the holding in
Jacksonville Port Authority which stated economic development alone does
not serve a paramount public purpose.7 3 The court failed to cite any particular
public purpose the motel serves other than promoting general economic
development.74 Almost any business indirectly benefits the public by providing
employment and increasing local tax revenues. The court did not enunciate
65. Id. at 744. The dissent further concluded that low cost, publicly assisted financing of
motels to meet a lodging demand was not a public necessity. Id. at 744-45. See supra note 24
and accompanying text.
66. 424 So. 2d at 744-45.
67. Id. at 745.
68. See supra notes 12-29 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
71. In earlier cases, the court balanced the public purpose of the project against the degree of private benefit conferred, refusing to authorize projects which provided more than
an incidental private benefit. See, e.g., State v. Manatee County Port Auth., 193 So. 2d 162,
164 (Fla. 1966); State v. Board of Control, 66 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1953).
72. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 24.
74. The Orange County court found the hotel not only promoted economic de-

velopment but was also necessary to the convention center's success. See supra note 47.
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any factors to distinguish between businesses serving paramount public purposes and those providing only incidental public benefits.7 5
As in Nohrr,76 the court deferred to the legislative finding of public purpose
to uphold the motel bond validation. In the instant case, however, it is not
entirely clear that the challenged statute qualifies motels not directly connected
to tourist attractions as public projects. 77 The court's broad interpretation of
the statute provides a clear signal that it will continue to validate industrial
development bonds for any project the legislature declares necessary to economic development. This indiscriminate deference to legislative findings of
public purpose has subtly eroded the public purpose doctrine.71
The history of industrial development bond financing in Florida has often
involved competing policies of promoting economic development and protecting against government encroachment on free enterprise. Publicly assisted, low
cost financing provides incentives for business to enter Florida. 79 However,
when sufficient demand exists to stimulate private capital investments in a
project, 0 industrial development bonds should not compete for the project's
financing. Legislative guidelines are needed to insure industrial development
bonds will not provide a competitive advantage to corporations exerting the
most political influence over industrial development authorities. Otherwise,
the continued expansion of the public purpose doctrine, through legislative
fiat, may ultimately compromise the integrity of free enterprise in Florida
and render meaningless the constitutional prohibition against lending public
credit.
JEFFREY

C.

REGAN

75. A recent Florida Supreme Court decision further obfuscates the distinction between
businesses serving public purposes and those that do not. Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth.
v. State, 427 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1983). In that case, the court found that a television station does
not serve a public purpose, and thus denied industrial development bond financing.

Ironically a motel serves a public purpose while a television station does not, despite the
fact that FCC regulations require public service time commitments from television stations.
76. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
78. In contrast to the numerous legislative exceptions to the public credit limitations,
the constitution provides exceptions only for airports, port facilities, and industrial and
manufacturing plants. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10(c).
79. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
80. For example, the instant court noted the anticipated demand for 20,000 additional
motel rooms due to Disney World's expansion. See supra note 59. Such a profitable opportunity should stimulate private investments in financing motel construction.
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